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I  . 
A  EURO.PEAN  EXPORT  BANK 
(Conmru.nication  from  the  Commission  to  the Council) 
INTRODUCTION 
1.  In recent years,  the  idea of creating a  new  Community 
instrument  in the  export  credit field has· often  been referred 
to.  In his  speech  to  the  European  Parliament  in February this 
year,  the  President of  the  Commission  indicated  the  importance 
which  the  Commission attaches  to a  European  Export  Bank.  In  the 
present  communication  the  Commission examines  the  opportunity of 
creating  such an  instrument,  and  the  objectives  and methods  which 
it might  adopt.  This  analysis  shows  that both  the world  context 
and  the  problems  which  Community  exporters already  face  make  it 
important  to make  progress  in this area without delay.  The 
Commission  considers  that  a  European Export  Bank  (E.E.B.)  should 
initially concentrate  on  the  provision of finance  and  insurance 
for multinational contracts of  a  Community  nature  for  the  export 
of capital goods  (and  related  services)  to all destinations 
outside  the  EEC.  The  Commission will  pursue its consultation 
with  public  and  private sector export credit insurers,  banking 
and  industrial circles in the  Community,  and will  submit  to 
the  Council  a  full  proposal  in the  light of  the results of  these 
opinions  and  consultations. 
II.  GENERAL  ANALYSIS 
(a)  !he world  economy 
Very  rapid  changes are now  taking  place  in  the  world 
economy,  in the  light of  the oil crisis of  1973  and  the 
consequences  which have  followed  from it affecting all countries 
of  the  v.7orld.  It is clear that if the  present economic 
difficulties of  the  industrialised countries are  to  be  overcome, 
and if the  redistribution of wealth  between developing  and 
industrialised countries which  the  former  seek is to  take  place, 
there must  be  continued  and  increased  expansion of world  economic 
growth.  It is vital that world  trade  should  be  able  to regain 
and  nmintain  the  momentum it showed  in the  two  decades after 
the  Second World  War. 
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3.  The  Community  now  faces  the  threat of  a  long  term deficit 
in its balance  of  payments  by  reason  of  the  very  large  in~xease 
in the  price of oil and  the  possibility of  a  further increase 
in the  price  of certain essential raw materials  from  third 
countries.  Fluctuations in the  price of  raw materials  -
increases  as well  as decreases-,  the  overheating of their 
economies  and  the  inflation experienced  by  the Western 
countries  have  brought  about  considerable alterations in 
international  terms  of  trade.  In  these  circumstances,  the 
growth  of exports represents  an  immediate necessity  to  Member 
States of  the  Community.-
4.  The  effect of  the  increase in the  price of  certain raw 
materials  and fertilisers is 
very  serious  for  certain developing countries which  lack 
energy  and  foodstuffs.  These  countries are  obliged  in the 
short  term  to  reduce  the  volume  of  their imports.  It is 
in the  interest both  of  these countries  and  of  the  Community 
to  find  means  to  reduce  these difficulties as  much  as 
possible. 
5.  On  the  other hand,  the  capacity of  some  developing 
countries  to build up  their competitive  industrial production 
capacity has  greatly  increased.  Some  are already  seeking  to 
use  their enlarged  foreign  currency resources  to increase  the 
pace  of  their transformation into industrialised societies 
and  of  the  development  of  their natural resources.  The 
Co~nunity cannot resist this process;  indeed it has declared 
its readiness  to help it, has  already  taken measures  to this 
end  and  has  made  further practical suggestions  in the  same 
direction.  It may,  however,  be  possible  to do  more. 
6.  These  three objectives raise many  issues,  to which  a  broad 
range  of  solutions is needed.  But  these  solutions overlap 
i.n  an  important respect;  the attainment  of  each objective would 
be  helped  by  means  to  stimulate  Community  exports, particularly 
of capital goods.  This will help  the  Community's  balance  of 
payment  situati.on and  the  growth  of world  trade;  the  exports 
••• /will 
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will contribute  to  the  economic  expansion of  the developing 
countries;  and  if appropriate  f:f.nancial  arrangements  can  be 
made  the  situation of  the  least developed  countries >:vill be eased. 
7.  The  threat of  recession and  the  increase  in unemployment 
which  is affecting the  European  economies  as well  as  those  of 
the United  States of America  and  Japan, will increase competition 
for export orders  not  only  in traditional markets  where  demand 
is likely to contract, but also in the  expanding markets  of 
the oil producing countries. 
8.  The  Community  countries will therefore  be  confronted 
in  these markets with: 
(i) projects  (e.g.  engineering,  infrastructure,  turnkey 
plants,  raw material exploitation)  on  such  a  scale  that 
n~ltinational consortia may  well  be  the  best means  of 
response  for  both  technological and  financial reasons,  and 
(ii) competition  from  third  country  firms,  notably American  and 
Japanese~ whose national authorities  provide  extremely sophi-
sticated  systems  of  export  subsidies  perfectly geared  to 
their foreign  trade  policy  (see descriptions  of  the 
existing systems  of  these  two  countries at Annexes  I  and 
II and  a  comparison at Annex III). 
9.  It is not  in the  interest of  the  Community  to respond 
to  such  competition by  a  war  of export credit  terms.  The 
Community  is not  alone  in needing  to  expand  its exports  in the 
face  of economic difficulties.  It has undertaken not  to  seek 
to  improve its position by  action harmful  to others.  And  in 
the  export credit field the  Community  is trying  with  our  majer  trading 
partners  to  find  a  way  of  limi.ting competition  on  export 
credit terms.  But  whi I.e  an  export credit race  i. s  to be  avoided, 
within  such rules  as  ex_i s t  and  as  may  be  agreed  ( e . g.  the 
proposed Gentleman's Agreement)  the  Community  should 
nevertheless  try  to establish means  of matching  the  advantages 
now  av~ilable to  Cotnmunity  firms'  main  competitors  in the  US 
and  Japan, notably  the  provision of export credit facilities in 
a  single currency. 
• •• /(b) - 4  -
(b)  The  coherence  of  the  Comnrunity 
10.  At  present, each  Member  country has  a  different administrative 
system and differing institutional arrangements  for  assundng 
the  availability of  export credit finance. 
There are,  furthermore, differences  in philosophy  between 
• 
different Comnunity  countries  on  the  question of  subsidy  of  ~ 
export credit finance.  The  result is  a  lack of  coherence  in the 
Community's  arrangements~ and  a  number  of disparate  systems 
serving  economies  individually less  powerful  than  the  Community's 
competitors  and~ moreover,  competing with each other in foreign 
markets  to  the mutual disadvantage  of  the  Member  States. 
11.  In an area as  economically critical to  the  Community's 
commercial  policy,  such  a  situation cannot 
be  regarded  as  satisfactory.  With  the  objective of  economic 
and  monetary union  also  in mind,  it is clear that comprehensive 
arrangements  covering  the whole  field  of  export  finance  must 
be  made  by all Member  States  to avoid  possible  internal 
competition and distortion as  a  result of official intervention, 
to  give  Member  States'  capital goods  exporters  the  capacity  to 
combine  together  and  to compete  with  the  full weight  of  the 
Community 1s  economic  strength to  support  them,  and  to  give  the 
Community  the  ability  to  make  its voice  felt in international 
negotiations.  Adequate  arrangements  are  increasingly needed  to 
harmonise  first  the  principles and  then  the  practices of  the 
Member  States in  the  export credit field. 
12.  Work  in  the  Community  to  this  end  has  gone  on  for  many 
years,  but has  accomplished  little.  The  Cormnission  last year 
·proposed  a  fresh  approach,  and  work is now  making  some  progress. 
But  this is necessarily a  long  term matter.  This  fresh  approach 
which  dea.ts  essentially with  a  better coherence  between 
the different  export credit  systems  within the  Community 
in no  way  affects the necessity for  the  Community  to provide 
itself with  tlle  means  to  support  collaborative  joint 
ventures  between  Community  exporters. 
13.  This  need  has  already  been appreciated.  Collaborative 
arrangements  exist between  the  export credit insurers 
of  the  Community;  these  are described in Annex  IV. 
Such  arrangements  have  undoubtedly helped  in several 
cases.  But  for  the  reasons  indicated in the Annex,  the 
techniques developed  do  not  cope  with  the  central  problem 
of export credit for multinational contracts, which 
as  the  next  section  shows  is the  provision of  finance 
in one  currency. - 5  -
•  III.  THE  IMMEDIATE  ISSUES 
(a)  ~ltinational capital  goods  contract~ 
14.  As  already explained,  the  main  problem is  that of developing 
adequate  arrangements  for multinational projects in which  firms· 
from different  ~~mber States  combine  for  the  export of capital 
goods  (and  related  services).  Opportunities  for  which  such 
consortia are  an  appropriate  response  already exist;  their 
number  is likely  to  grow. and  should  be  encouraged. 
15.  Consortia of  this kind  may  take  the  form of  a  lead  firm 
from  one  country  who  is responsible  for  the  contract  and  who 
assumes  all the  responsibility  on  behalf of  a  network of 
subcontractors.  But  in large  projects it is more  likely that 
two  or more  firms will  jointly conclude  the  contract with  the 
buyer,  though  subcontracting will add  to  the  complexity  of  the 
arrangements.  In  such cases,  firms  from  more  than  one 
Connnunity  country  cannot at  the  moment  readily offer a  single 
contract in a  single currency, unlike their US  and  Japanese 
competitors  who  have  no  currency  problem and  for  whom  export 
credit and  guarantee  arrangements  are  of course  the  same. 
16.  So  far,  two  courses  of action have  been  taken  by 
Connnunity  firms.  First, arrangements  have  been made  to  channel 
separate  streams  of  foreign  currency  to  a  single  buyer under 
the  aegis  of  separate official support  schemes.  However, 
this does  not  match  the  increased  preference  shown  by  overseas 
buyers  for negotiating  one  contract with  one  single currency 
and  one  set of  payment  conditions  subject  to  one  law. 
Indeed,  multi-currency  contracts  are  becoming  increasingly 
impossible  to negotiate,  particularly for  large projects. 
Matters  are  complicated  further  by  the  lack of  a  focal  point 
for  administration or negotiation. 
17.  Second,  many  large projects have  been  financed  by  Euro 
market  borrowing,  either directly or  through  connnerci.al  banks . 
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This  enables  single  currency  finance  to  be  provided  to  the 
buyer.  Rue  ie does  noe  seem  eh~t the  Euro  market  should  be 
regarded  as  a  permanent  channel  by  which  firms  should  have 
to  finance  their international  transactions.  It is not 
wholly  reliable as  a  source  of  funds  whenever necessary, 
and  also because direct access  to it is de  facto restricted 
to relatively  few  firms  and  because  in many  cases  such  funds 
are not available at fixed  interest rates.  Moreover,  provision 
of  finance  to  the  buyer in a  single  currency does not relieve 
the  members  of  the  consortia  from  the  exchange  risk, while 
it does  nothing  to  solve·the  problem of  a  single  form of 
export credit guarantee  and  insurance  arrangement.  And  of 
course,  such  funds  are  only available at market  rates which 
may  at  times ·be  appreciably  higher  than export credit 
funds  available  to  competitors. 
18.  In addition,  given  the  scale  of  some  large  projects 
calling for multinational participation and  their increasing 
technical  content,  the  size of  the risks involved is very 
considerable  and  exceeds  that normally  borne  by  national 
insurers. 
·, 
' 
19.  These  considerations  point  to  the  need  to  improve  existing 
arrangements  in the  Community  for multinational  financing  of 
export credits in a  single currency.  It is clear that 
simplicity would  be  served if integrated  arrangements  were 
devised  which  promoted  the  drawing up  of  a  single contract 
in  a  single  currency  incorporating  a  single interest rate  and 
which  provided  for official intervention  so  that interest 
rate  subsidies  could  be  provided  when  necessary  to match  third 
conntry  competition. 
(b)  Flow of investment  financing 
20.  In  the  context of nultinatior..al cap_tcil g:x:.ds  c0ntracts,  e~~port credits 
are i:e.ntamouGi:  i:o  t~le  :l:ilran.c..ing  a( investment •  Funding  of export 
credit activity must  therefore  be  placed  in a  more  general 
context.  It is now  generally accepted  that  funds  should  flow 
...  /from 
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from developing countries with  surplus  funds  towards  investment 
in less  favoured  developing areas.  At  present  th~ flow of 
such  funds  for "triangular" re-cycling is sluggish.  A 
Community  organisation to provide  export credits which had 
access  to international capital markets  could  be  an important 
mechanism  in this re-cycling,  and  would  therefore  increase  the 
availability of  export credit. 
IV.  THE  EXPERIENCE  OF  THE  EXPORTING  INDUSTRIES  IN  THE  EEC 
21.  Some  recent examples  seem  to  indicate  that European firms, 
working  in isolation, have  in several cases failed  to win 
important  contracts  because  they  could not depend  upon  an 
export credit  system as efficient as  those  of  their American 
or Japanese direct competitors. 
22.  The  absence  of  such  a  system has  certainly made  it more 
difficult  to arrange  group  tenders  by  firms  of different  Member 
States.  In  some  cases it has  been possible  to fill this gap  by 
the  pragmatic  methods  referred  to but  the  complexity  of  these 
solutions often discourages  our exporters as well as  their 
customers;  such  solutions are purely  "ad hoc",  and  leave  the 
basic  problem unsolved.  Thus,  the  examples  given us  in 
confidence  by  Community  firms  bring out clearly the  dynamic 
role  played  by  the  export credi't institutions in  the  United 
States and  Japan • 
. 23.  In general t  industrial as well as credit insurance circles 
with whom  the  Commission  has  had discussions  have  stressed  the 
desirability of  (1)  reorganising and  clarifying existing 
credit institutions'  practices. especially export credit 
practices at Community  level;  (2)  setting up  a  financial 
institution similar to  the  Japanese  or American  Eximbanks 
which will enable  European  firms  to  face up  to international 
competition by  offering finance  on  t'erms  at least as  good  and 
at least as  speedily as  their competitors. 
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?;1,  One  mir,ht  mention in this context certain problems  which  have arisen in connection 
Hith  negotiations for the sale of  Community  aircraft.  Negotiations  were  opened vlith 
n  tl1ircl  country whioh  wanted  to  nu;y  eitlie:t'  'tl1c  Cortununity  airorr.tft  Ot'  l!l.  oompeti'to:r. 
Bcc2..use  of  the  existing fleet  structure of the  purchar.;er the.offer needed to be par-
ticularly competitive.  The  competitor  was  able to  offer credit for 12  years at 
a  fixed rate of interest of  7%,  the  amount  of the credit being divided between the 
official  sources  (45%)  at a  6%  interest rate and a  private bank  (~5%) at a  7-75% 
interest rate.  Tne  Community  firms'offer was  credit for 12  years provided as  to 
40%  from  public  services at a  fixed rate of interest of  7%,  the remaining  60~ of 
the credit in  Eurodollars at  a  9%  interest rate.  However,  the  interest rate on  the 
E.'urodol Jars Nas  guaranteed to remain at  9~b for only 5-7 years,  after \'lhich  the. rate 
vlas  to "float".  ~von if the rate were  to  remidn fixed for the entire period of the 
Joan  and  in the  absence  of an.y  other monetary complications  occurring in the  meantime, 
the  Community  firms'  offer was  1~  above  the competitor's offer.  For a  contract 
value  of ~79 million,· the difference represented about  ~8 million which  the purchaser 
vrou1d  have  had  to  pa}r  in addition. 
25 •  The  idea then  was  to sell the Comnru.nity  aircraft thr.ough  only one  of  the  participating, 
firms  in order  to  obtain for  t!1e  whole  of the operation the benefit  of certain finc'1llcial 
facilities Granted to  exporters  in the Member  Country concerned.  For various  reasons 
this solution was  not practicable.  Other solutions,  even more  complicated,  were 
considered such as  a  miA~re of selling and leasing,  but without  success. 
26.  Another  exanpJ,~ Has  a  proposed capital goods  contract  to  supply the third country 
p;over:nmen t  vri th a  turnkey plant to make  heavy constructional '\'larks  equipment.  The 
contract value was  ~ US  120  million.  There  were  to  be  French,  UK,  German  and Belgian 
suppliers with a  small  foreign content.  The  credit requested was  85%  of contract ·value 
in 20  oqunl  consecutive half yearly instalments,  the first payable 6 months  after 
completion of delivery in month  44•  The  contract was  lost because  the offer contained 
four  sets of payment  terms  in four  currencies in four laws. 
2[.  These  examples,  very briefly analysed here,  show  how  multinational  projects of 
undoubted European  interest can be lost against  competitors whose  offers are not 
only more  favourable  from  a  financial  point  of view,  but also clear and neat  from 
a  commercial  point of view.  The  Commission's contacts with the credit  insurance 
circles, with  many  industrial  ~rganisations and with  industry direct  confirms that 
this is not an  isolated example.  The  lack of adequate  export  credit facilities has 
played a  part - often significant - in the loss of many  contracts especially for 
medium  sized firms.  And  this lack also hinder the  development  of  joint ventures  by 
Community  firms  for which  such facilities are very important. - 9-
THE  CASE  FOR  A NEd  UJSTITUTION 
28.  The  preceding analysis demonstrates the problems which  have  to be resolved.  Can  an 
anS11er  be  found  in tl1e  existing framework  of collaboration between  Community  insti  tu-
tions? 
29.  As  already noted,  collaborative arrangements  of various kinds exist between the 
export credit insurers of the  Community.  Th~se provide a  partial response  to  the pro-
blems  of multinational contracts through reciprocal  cover,  coinsurance,  joint insurance, 
reinsurance and special financial  packages.  Such  arrangements have  been a  useful means 
of combining the efforts of different national  institutions.  It would be prima facie 
attractive to develop this cooperation,  possibly even to the point of a  formal  agreement. 
But  the full  range  of the existing techniques is not available to all Community  exporters 
as  some  national  institutions are limited by  their legislation from  taking part in cer-
tain of these operations.  More  important,  none  of these techniques  can  overcome  the 
central  problem of multinational  contracts- that of the exchange  risk which  must  arise 
when  different currencies are  involved with the objective  of providing a  single  steam of 
single currency finance and  insurance under  one  contract.  The  only way  in which  this 
problem could be resolved in the existing framework  would  be  for each  Member  State to 
pass legislation enabling its export  credit and  insurance  institutions to fully finance 
and pay claims  in currencies other than their own  (at present this is not possible in 
any Member  State). Separately,  many  other differences in approach to credit  insurance  and 
guarantees would also need to be  resolved;  experience to date  in the Community  shows  that 
it is not  easy to  ~ce progress  in this field.  For these different reasons,  the pos-
sibility of constructing unified arrangements  on  the basis of the existing institutions 
is not  encouraging,  to deal with the problems  of multinational  contracts of which  the 
number  is likely to grow  appreciably in the future. 
30.  The  Commission has considered the possibility that the functions  of  the  European 
Investment Bank  (EIB)  be enlarged so as to include that of a  EEB.  This however  raises 
many  difficult problems- institutional,  financial  and technical.  Nevertheless,  the 
Commission  will conm1lt the EIB  in the  course of its future work. 
31.  In the light of this analysis,  the  Commission  considers that a  new  institution is 
needed to deal  with the problems  of multinational projects.  This institution should be 
created alongside  existing institutions and without the prior need for further coordina-
tion of their practices or for major  changes  in national legislation.  Once  established 
it could help with the harmonization of Community  practice in other areas of  export 
credits.  But  this process need only be gradual,  as patterns of Community  commercial 
behaviour develop.  In any  event,  the creation of a  new  institution should  in no  way 
hamper  initiatives taken in the private sector, ·for the new  institution would not act 
as a  substitute for  commercial  and  merchant  banks who  generate export business,  but  rathE!l 
as  a  complement  to  them. 
32e  More  immediately,  a  new  institution would be  able to develop a  role in the provision 
of finance.  The  scale of finance needed for multinational capital goods  projects is 
already very  larg<~ and is likely to grow  further.  In view of this,  the  commercial  banks 
and existing official institutions cannot be  relied on  to provide all the necessary 
finance,  even if the essential requirement  of exchange  risk cover were  guaranteed them; 
this may  be  a  particular problem for medium  and  small  exporters.  A new  institution could 
l1ave  direct access to the markets  in order itself to tap large scale funds as appropriate. 
33.  When  se:;  up,  the main objective of an EEB  would be  to offer,  both to the Community 
exporters a:1d  to foreign buyers of capital goods  and services produced within the 
Community,  'redit and insurance  on  terms  comparable  to those available in other major 
exporting C)untrieso  Thus  its primary function would be  the provision of export credit - 10  -
finance  and  credit  insurance  for multinational  cc.pital  projects 
of  a  Community  nature  to all destinations outside 
the  EEC,  including: 
the  financing  of  exports  of capital goods  and  of 
ancillary costs; 
related management,  training and  other service contracts. 
34.  In  stating this as  the  immediate  objective, it must  be 
remembered  that other possible roles exist.  In  the  export 
credit field,  the  activity of  the  E.E.B.  could  if  so 
desired at  a  later stage  be  extended  to  cover other activities 
of  a  particular priority.  Other  possibilities are: 
provision of investment guarantees against political risks; 
support  for  imports  posing  a  particular problem  (raw 
materials); 
finance  for  medium  and  l~ng-term  s~pp~y contracts  notebly 
in the  agricultural  sector. 
These  possibilities are  examined  further in Section VII. 
VI.  SPECIFIC  CONSIDERATIONS 
(a)  Operations 
35.  The  functions  of  the  E.E.B.  would  be  to  provide  export 
credit insurance,  supplier and  buyer credits for multinational 
consortia of  a  Community  character  (not  excluding consortia in 
which  a  minority  interest is taken  by  non-Community  firms). 
Contracts  of  this nature will inevitably  be  for  periods of  5  to 
10 years,  and  probably for  amounts al:nle a l.e\e1 to be definrl lcte:J;  The 
E.E.B.  would  seek  to work  alongside  the existing credit 
insurers,  commercial  banks,  and  institutions in this field.  The 
Bank would  in most  cases expect  to  provide  only part of  the 
finance  needed  because  adequate  arrangements  would  be  made  with 
commercial  banks  and/or institutions for  the  supply  of  the rest, 
it being understood  that adequate  arrangements entail the 
provision of export credit insurance facilities  by  the  Bank. 
36.  It will be  necessary  for  the  E.E.B.  :  to  adopt  practices 
which  respond  to as  many  as  possible  of  the  following  requirements: 
(i)  that the  Bank  should  aim to break even; - 11  -
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(ii) that it must  be  ready  to help exporters  to match  competition 
from other countries in the  commercial  export credit 
field; 
(iii)  that within the  framework  of  internationally agreed 
practice its  terms  both in respect of interest rates and 
length of credit may  need  to  take  account  of  the 
situation of developing countries. 
(b)  Structure 
37.  The  E.E.B.  should  take  the  form of  a  banking 
institution.  It "tvould  need  to have  day-to-day management 
independence,  but  on  the  other hand it is clear that  the 
Community  institutions will.need  to keep under regular review 
the  policy directions  given  to  the  Bank. 
38.  The  E.E.B.  can  be  established  on  the  basis sf Article  113, 
and pgssibly  completed  by  Article  235  0f the  EEC  Treaty. 
• • ./  (c)  • • • 
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(c)  Financing 
39.  The  E.E.B.  will need  to  be  endowed  with  an initial 
fixed  capital.  The  amount  of this capital will depend  on  an 
analysis of  the  likely involvement  of  the  E.E.B.  in export 
credit and  other transactions,  and  may  be  influenced  by  its 
financing pattern.  The  capital could  be  subscribed  in part 
by  existing institutions in the  Member  States, and  could  be 
paid up  in several instalments according  to  the  development 
of  the  Bank's  activity in the  field of export credit, since 
at a  later stage it may  be desired  to expand  the role of  the 
Bank. 
40.  It is to  be  expected  that borrowing activity will be  a 
major  source  of  finance  for  the  E.E.B.  Therefore, 
it is important  that it should  have  access  to national and 
international capital markets.  To  enable  the  Bank  to  become 
a  major  CommUnity  instrument of  borrowing arrangements will 
have  to  be  made  to  assure  the market  of  the  security of  any 
claims  on  the  Bank,  which could  involve  some  form of recourse 
to  the  Community  (presumably  to  the  Community  Budget). 
41.  Given  the need  to match competition  from other countries, 
the  particular range  of  the  Bank's  business  may  lead  to  the 
need  for  subventions  in order  to permit interest to  be  charged 
below cost.  On  large contracts involving  long  term finance 
official export credit funds  have  been made  available  in 
recent years  by  most  (though not all) major  trading countries 
at interest rates which  are often below  the  true cost  in 
market  terms,  though  by differing amounts.  This may  change 
in  the  future, _as  market  rates fall.  But  the  possibility of 
subsidy  cannot  be  excluded.  It will be  necessary  to  examine 
different means  of  limiting whatever  subsidy is necessary, 
e.g.  by  limiting the  amount  of finance  provided  for  each 
projet  by  the  Bank.  It may  be  that in the  early stages 
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the resources  required  to permit preferential interest rates 
cs.n  be  provided  from  the  income  earned  by  the initial paid-up  -' 
capital of  the  Bank.  But it is likely that  some  continuing 
financial assistance of  the  Bank will be  needed until a 
possible  future  stage when  its business will be  sufficiently  ~­
broad  to  encompass  profitable as well as  loss-making activities. 
This  assistance will be  the  reflection of exports  by 
Community  firms;  it could  be  shared  between  the  Member  State~ 
in accordance with  the  split of  these  exports  between  the 
Member  States,  but  this would  be difficult to establish 
because  of  the  amount  of  subcontracting involved  in nrultinaticinal 
projects and  would  involve  a  series of ad  hoc  keys  for  the 
cost of  each  project.  lt would  seem more  sensible  and 
more  desirable  that  the assistance  (if any)  should  be  a 
charge  on  the  Community  budget.  Conversely,  arrangements 
would  have  to  be  envisaged  to cover  transfer to  the  budget  n 
of any  profit which  might arise after the  necessary  establishment 
[' 
of reserves  by  the  Bank. 
42.  It is not  possible at this 
the  fixed  capital needed  or  any 
( 
stage  to indicate  the  size of 
possible operational costs. 
"  These will depend  on  the number  of  projects  financed  and  the 
'  '  percentage  of contract value  to  be  financed,  and  on  the  changing 
relationship between credit terms  and  market rates.  At  the 
outset,  therefore, it will be  necessa1~ to fix guidelines 
within which  the  E.E.B. 
light of experience. 
should work,  to be  renewed  in  the 
lE 
(d)  Exchange  risks 
43.  The  aim of  the  E~E.B.  would  be  to enable  nrulti.natioilal 
export credit  .c:nd  insuranC;e  contracts  to  b·e  .:::~·~pr2sscd  in a 
single  currency.  ~tis poses  a  series of  problems: 
(i)  suppliers'  costs are  incurred in their  own  national 
currencies.  They  are reluctant to  take  on  an  exchaDge 
risk and  therefore require  to recover costs in their own 
currencies.  This  is generally possible during the  periocl 
up  to delivery of  the  goods  by  forward  sales of  the 
currency  the  supplier is due  to  receive  from  the  buyer  lE  .-
in final  settlement at that time.  However,  the  facilities 
••• /of the  forward of  the  forward  exchange market might not  prove  adequate 
for very  long delivery periods except  on  a  rollover basis, 
and  recent developments have  done  much  to contract  the 
forward  market  in certain currencies. 
(ii) given that  the  E.E.B.'s  main  source  of  finance  may 
be  international borrowing,  the  choice of  borrowing 
units v;ill have  to match  as  much  as  possible  the 
currencies  in which  the  Bank  is to  give credits.  In 
recent years,  the dollar has  been predominant  in 
international transactions.  But  in future,  there  may  well 
be  scope  to  expand  the  role of  the  European unit of 
account.  (The  problems  of  borrowing  and  contracting 
currencies  must  be  studied further. 
in  Annex  V.) 
Some  points are discussed 
(iii) Some  exchange  risks  may  remain,  however,  if a  complete 
matching  of  finance  and  credits is not  possible.  Apart 
from  buyer credits,  the  problem of  supplier credits is 
Likely  to  give rise  to risks  to  the extent that  any 
finance  provided  to  Member  States'  suppliers is in 
national currencies.  This  problem might  be  reduced  if 
the  E.E.B.  were  better endowed  with  working  funds 
in the national currencies of  the  Member  States or borrowed 
in national capital markets. 
(e)  Spreading  the ·risk of export credit  insurance 
44.  The  risks which  arise  from  insurance  of  important  contracts 
are already  large  and  likely to get  larger as  the  size  and 
technical complexity of  the  projects covered  increase.  Thus 
in addition  to  the  burden  of  financing  and  interest rates 
already discussed  there is a  problem of risk, which  to  be  well 
spread  a.nd  well  balanced must  take  account  of export  projects 
to all destinations outside  the  EEC. 
45.  In due  course  a  decision will be  needed  on  the  proportion 
of risk to  be  covered.  In addition,  a  major  technical  problem 
which  would  have  to  be  resolved if it proved  possible  to devise 
integrated arrangements,  is that of recourse.  The  existence of 
multinational  supply  contract  implies  that  a  lead  contractor  (or 
contractors)  would  have  to undertake  the  proper fulfilment 
of  the  contract.  Recourse  arises where  an  overseas  borrower 
defaults under  a  loan agreement at a  time  when  the  exporter is 
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in default under his  supply  cont~act.  In  these  circumstances 
an  insurer or  gua·rantor,  while  paying whatever  loss is due  to 
lending banks,  would  have  to  consider how  best it might  take 
recourse  to  the  exporter or exporters  since it is a  cardinal 
principle in any  policy of  insurance  that it is up  to  the 
assured  to  take due  diligence.  If he  himsel~ crEates  a  loss 
situation then he  must  be  made  to  pay  back  to  the  insurer 
or guarantor all sums  which  that  insurer or guarantor has 
disbursed  to  lending banks.  This  is a  problem which  exists  to  a 
greater or  lesser extent in each  Member  country. 
46.  The  scale  of  the  risks  involved  might  require  the 
E.E.Bo  to  reinsure with other institutions.  One 
possibility would  be  for  the.Bank  to reinsure with national 
agencies either part or all of  the risks relating to  the 
supply  from  that country.  If this course were  followed, 
problems  could  arise as  to  the  currency  in which  the 
reinsurance  could  be  organised. 
(f)  Relationship with  commercial  banks 
47.  The  commercial  banks will wish  to continue  to maintain 
their role  in the  export credit field  and  the  relationship 
with  their clients that results.  For its part,  the  E.E.B. 
will wish  to  keep its financing role  to  the  minimum  necessary 
and  should wish  to  take  advantage  of  the  present expertise of 
the  banks  in assessing projects.  It therefore  seems  desirable 
to envisage  that  the  commercial  banks  should  continue  to  play 
their role in providing a  certain percentage  of export finance, 
backed  by  guarantees  from  the  Bank.  One  possibility is that 
the  Bank  might  finance  the  later maturities of an export 
credit, with  the  commercial  banks  financing  the earlier 
maturities against  a  guarantee,  as is done  in the  USA. 
VII.  OTHER  POSSIBLE  ACTIVITIES 
4 8.  As  noted  above,  there are other important areas in which 
an  E.E.B.  could  at  some  stage in its development  be  called 
upon  to  play  a  role. 
• •• /(a)  • •• 
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(a)  r:s.r,.:r  material  supply 
4 9.  If at a  first stage  the  E.E.B.  de  a 1 s  on  1  y  wi t h  trultinatlmal 
capi;:a.l  goods  €~~pori:  credit contracts, its role  could  late.r oe 
extended  to other activities of priority interest in  the  export 
credit field.  For  example,  large  investment  projects which  are 
of particular Community  interest 
not 
but  which dojinvolve multinational consortia could  be  financed  in 
cases  where  the  cost would  be  excessive for  a  national institution 
on its own.  But  for  the  time  being existing arrangements  appear 
adequate  outside  the  field  of multinational  consortia, while  the 
E.E.B.  would  be  better able  to deal with  any  other export 
credit fields after it had  gained  some  initial experience. 
(b)  Investment  guarantees  against political risks 
SQ.  As  mentioned  above,  the  functions  of  an  E.E.B.  could 
include  the  provision of  investment  guarantees against  political 
risks.  It is  probably  true  that investment  is held  back  in a 
number  of  countries  by  political uncertainties.  Insurance against 
political risks may  be  a  solution.  Some  Member  States have 
schemes  of cover against political risks.  But  the  scope  of  such 
schemes  is limited,  and  could  perhaps  be  usefully expanded.  But, 
at  least as  a  measure  in isolation,  such  insurance has  a  number 
of disadvantages.  The  first disadvantage  is that political risks 
of  foreign  investments  of  the  classical pattern are  now  very 
great  in most developing countries.  The  potential costs are  thus 
very  large  indeed,  and  not readily reinsured.  Second,  the 
capital base  required  to deal with  investment  guarantees is of  a 
different  type  from export credit .insurance,  given that  investme~ 
are  made  normally  for  20-30 years whereas  sales of  goods  are 
dealt with  in general  for no  longer  than  10  years.  Third,  a 
failure  to  pay  for  economic  reasons  in a  sale of  goods 
transaction does  not  produce  dead  loss money  but  becomes  the 
subject  of  a  claim and  perhaps  in due  course  a  re-scheduling 
operation which  means  that  the  money  is finally repaid. 
It is universally recognised that  the availability of 
insurance against political risks in the  investment  guarantee 
field is a  determining factor for an investment  to take 
place.  The  absence  of  a  coherent  pattern of protection 
for  Community  investors means  that reliance can only  be 
placed  on existing national  investment  guarantee  schemes 
which  are  evaluated differently. 
·51.  There are various  answers  to these  problems.  One  lies 
in adequate  agreements  of protection with the host  governments. 
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Another  lies in the development  of  international arbitration 
procedures  (e.g.  through  the  IBRD  sponsored  ICSID).  And  in 
the  long  term  the  solution lies not  in the  field  of political 
risk guarantees  but with  the extension of  ownership  by  iocal 
interests of  investment in developing countries.  This will 
give rise to  new  problems  of  financing,  in the  solution of 
some  of  which  the  Bank  may  have  a  role  to play.  For this, 
however,  the  Bank would  need  to dispose  of considerable 
additional funds. 
(c)  Support  for  imports  posing a  particular problem 
52.  It would  also be  possible  for  the  E.E.B.  to  provide 
finance  for  imports  posing particular problems.  The  most 
obvious  case  is of certain raw materials.  Here,  whether  on 
its own  or in  the  framework  of  international commodity 
agreements,  the  Community  could  for certain products  decide 
to  build up  a  stock which  would  require  financing.  This  could 
be  an appropriate  occasion for  financial  support  from  the 
Bank.  However, it is clear that the  initial costs  and  the 
risks  involved  in  such  an  arrangement  are  considerable  and  that 
at  the  present  state of development  of international  thinking 
on  raw materials it would  be  premature  to  ask  the  Bank  to 
undertake  this task. 
(d)  Long-term  supply contracts 
53.  In  the years  ahead,  the  Community  may  develop  a  new  form 
of action  - that of  pluri-annual contracts  (for  3  to  5  years) 
with  some  developing countries who  may  wish  to  secure  their 
supplies  from  the  Community  of essential agricultural 
commodities.  For  the  financing  of  such  imports,  these  countries 
seek credits  to  avoid  initial excessive  foreign  exchange  costs 
so  that their foreign  exchange  resources  can  be  devoted  to 
industrial development.  At  present, no  machinery exists at the 
level of  the  Community  to  provide  such credits, and  the 
E.E.B.  could  be  asked  to  play  a  role • 
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54.  But  such operations  would  increase  the  financing needs 
of  the  Bank,  and are  perhaps not readily compatible with  current 
practices in the field of commercial  export  credit  operations.  It is also 
unlikely that  such contracts would be multinational.  In these  circum~tances, it 
does not  seem appropriate that the  E.E.B.  should undertake 
this  task at the  outset. 
(e)  Aid activities 
s::s.  The  objectives  and  considerations  above  make  mention,  inter alia, 
.of activities of the  E.E.B.  in relationship with developing countries. 
It should  be  stressed, however,  that these activities  (even if, 
as  may  now  be normal,  a  degree  of concessional  finance  is 
involved)  are not development  aid  in the strict sense  (DAC 
definition), but  come  within the  range  of regular export 
credit activity of official organisations.  They  would 
be  fully covered  by,  and  subject to, any  international rules 
limiting competition in the  export credit field. 
56.  Apart  from  these activities however, it would  be  possible 
for  the  E.E.B.  to  play  a  part in aid activities properly 
defined  in relationship with  business  otherwise  coming  within 
its scope.  These activities could  follow  the  pattern of 
activity of  some  export credit institutions both within  the 
Community  and  elsewhere.  Activities of  this  kind would 
involve  considerable regular subventions.  They  seem more 
appropriate  for  a  possible later stage  in  the  Bank's 
development. 
VIII.  CONCLUSIONS 
5.7.  The  analysis  above  sketches  the  main  problems  which have 
to  be  resolved  in deciding  the  scope  and  methods  of  a 
E.E.B.  It will be  apparent  that  the  problems  are 
considerable.  Yet  as  the initial analysis demonstrates,  there 
is an urgent need,  if the  Community  is not  only  to match  the 
efforts of its main  trading partners  and  to  increase its own 
economic  coherence,  but also  to be  able  to fulfil its 
undertakings  to  the developing world.  It is of  paramount 
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importance  that this new institution should be in a 
position to give decisions  quickly witho11t  being overburned 
by  bureaucratic regulations.  In effects  the  E.E.BG 
should  be  able to respond rapidly and tailor its offers 
of  finance  and  insurance protection to meet  exporter 
requirements  on  a  case  by  case basis.  It is only if such 
action is taken  that Corrununity  finns will have  an equal 
chance  in the  competition for  the  increasing number  of  large 
scale  projects it is reasonable  to expect. 
58.  In drawing up  this analysis,  the  Commission  has  had  the 
benefit of contact \vith  official and  private  sector experts 
in banking, credit insurance  and  industrial circles.  But 
much  more  v.1ork  remains  to be  done  before  the detailed  structure 
and  methods  of  an  E.EoB.  can be  proposed.  The  Corrnnission 
intends  to pursue  this work actively,  and will to this  end 
invite  the assistance of national official experts as well 
as  of others.  It will  submit  a  formal  proposal  to  the  Council 
on  these aspects as  soon as progress with  these consultations 
permits. . THE  EXPORT- IMPORT  BANK  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 
I. History 
The  Export-Import  Bank  of Washington  (Eximbank)  was  established by 
Execut.ive  Order of the President  of the United States as a  bankil'l_g 
corporation in February 1934•.  Its function and  status altered over 
the years to meet  changing world trading conditions,  and in 1945  it 
was  re-constituted as an  independent  agency of the US  Government 
responsible directly to  Congress.  In recent years it has concentra-
ted on  its direct  lending and  credi"t  insurance facilities for expand-
ing US  ~xports. 
Ire  Eximbank  is  a: self-supporting agency.  It has a  basic capital of 
~ 1,000 million subscribed by  the ·us  Treasury and the annual divi-
dends paid by Eximbank to the  Treasury usually amount  to 5 %  of ·the 
Bank's capital  (Eximbank's dividend,  for fiscal year 1975,  was  reduced 
to  ~ 20 million or 2 %of its capital)o  It haa  the  right  to borrow 
up  to  ~ 6,000 million from  the  US  Treasury,  but  such borrowings have 
been relatively small  in recent yearso  Instead Eximbank  has  sold cer-
tificates of participation in export  folio,  debentures 7  and  short--
term promissory notes in the public money  market;  it should be  noted 
that Eximbank  no  longer raises funds directly from  the private money 
market,  all borrowings being made  from  the Federal Financing Bank,  which 
is administered by  the US  'I'reasury.  It is authorised to take  commit-
ments  in respect  of loans 9  guarantees and  insurance totalling ¢ 25,000 
million,  though this total "exposure"  can go  to  ~ 40.000 milliono 
Business  supported by  the  Bank  must  have  a  "reasonable assurance of 
payment"  but  since  1968  more  risky business  can be undertaken under 
the Export Expansion Facility provided it offers "sufficient .likelihood 
of repayment"..  Liability under thi  B  Facility must  not  exceed  ~ 500 
million at any  one  timea ANNEX  I 
III. Main  types  of activitl 
1.  One  of Eximbank's  major operations is its direct  loans,  which are 
dollar credits extended b.y  Eximbank  from  its own  resources directly 
to borrowers outside the United States for the purchase of US  gaods 
and  services.  The  minimum  period for which direct  loans are exten-
ded is normally  5 years.  Disbursements are  made  to the US  suppliers 
and the  loans are repaid by the borrowers under a  loan agreement 
entered into with Eximbank.  Originally,  Eximbank's practice was  to 
provide direct  finance  for 100 %  of the .oredi t, but pressure on its 
funds  led it to  introduce in 1968  a  programme  of Participation 
Financing,  ·Eximbank's direct  lending currency  supports from  30  to 
55% of a  contract's export price,  and financing provided by private 
commercial  banks  may  be  guaranteed by Eximbanko 
2.  Under  a  separate programme,  Eximbank  also gives Guarantees to  Commer-
cial Banks  who  finance  medium-term  credits without  recourse to the 
supplier.  The  commercial  bank carries part  of the  commercial  risks 
and Eximbank  carries the balance of these risks and the political 
risks on the  whole  credit.  Eximbank  will also under its Medi urn-Term 
Discount  Programme,  give an advance  commitment  to purchase  from  com-
mercial  banks  on a  case-by-case basis export  debts·which the banks 
have  financed  involving a  maturity of 1-5 years and occasionally 
longer,  "but  this facility is not available for bank  lending provided 
under the Participation Financing Programme. 
3·  Since  mid- 1969,  Eximbank have  operated a  11Cooperati  ve  Financing Fa-
cili  ty11  under which they make  available loans to overseas financial 
insti  tu·i;ions to  enable the latter in turn to make  loans to  small  and 
medium-sized buyers to finance the  import  of US  goods  on terms simi-
lar to those  which Eximbank would be  prepared to  support  for a  direct 
sale.  The  Eximbank  loan is for half the amount  of the advance,  the 
other half being provided by  the overseas financial institution from 
i"ts  ·own  resources.  The  risk on the borrower is carried by the fi-
nancial institution. 
4·  Eximbank  does  not  itself handle the  Credit  Insurance  Programme- for 
supplier credit  business.  This is administered b,y  the Foreign Credit 
Insurance Association  (FCIA)  - a  syndicate of private insurance  com-
panies in New  York  which nevertheless works  Olosely with Eximbank,  to ANNEX  I 
whom  it passes ba.ck  the political risks and the  larger commercial 
risks together with part of the premiums. 
5o  Eximbank and FCIA' s  Eremiums are based on the  length of credit  and 
market  classification and charged in relation to the percentage of 
the  contract value  insured.  For Financial Guarantees to banks under 
·the participation finance arrangements,  however,  Eximba."lk charges 
a  flat  rate "guarantee fee11  which currently ranges  from 0,75 %  to 
1,5 %per annum. 
IV.  Interest  rates 
lo  The blending of Eximbank direct financing with private commercial 
funds  (at a  fluctuating rate related to US :rrime  rates). results in 
current  rates of 8,8  - 10,2 %based on a  prime  rate of 8 %  an.d  Exim-
bank's  in~erest rates which  range  from 8,25 to 9,5 %~ .. 
An  important provision of Eximbankis  current  interest rate policy 
in that its standard interest rate may  be  reduced when  the Bank  is 
provided with evidence  of meaningful  foreign officially-supported 
export  credit  competj:~ion.  However,  Eximbank will not  reduce its 
standard interest rates to  such an extent that the blended interest 
rate for a  transaction falls below 7o5  percent,  the internationally 
agreed-upon minimum  export  credit interest ratea 
2~  Eximbank  and the  commercial  banks also  charge a  commitment  fee  of 
1/2 %  per annum  on  the undisbursed part of a  loano 
The  Private Export  Funding Corporation  ( PEFCO),  own.ed  mainly by US 
commercial  and industrial corporations,  was  formed  on the initiative 
of the Bankers'  Associa-tion for Foreign Tr,ade  to mobilise additional 
private capi·tal to assist in financing US  exportso  Its function is 
to provide  funds to fill a:ny·  financing gap  between the loan maturities 
commercial banks are prepared to take  and those  Eximbank  fi:ria.nces. 
Eximbank  guarantees  repayment  of any  finance provided and makes arrange-
ments  with  PEFCO  to enable it to offer a  fixed tntereat  rate..  However, 
the  amount  of finance provided by  PEFCO  in recent years has been small, 
as the  commercial banks have  been prepared to put up virtually the whole 
of any finance  not  provided by Eximbank  .. .  ; 
.. 
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ANNEX  II 
THE  EXPORT-ll:IPOR'r  Bi\}f'rC  OF  JAPAN" 
The  Export  Bank  of Ji1pan  Has  established in December  1950 under  the 
Ex:port  Bank  of Japan  La.~·l  as  a  government  financial  im;titution for 
medium  and  lonG-term  export  financin~.  In April  1952  import  financing 
was  added to its activities and the name  changed to the  I~port-I~port 
Ba.nk  of .Tc.pan  (&im)  ~  The  expressed purpo:;;es  of; F..x:irn  rclnv<mt  to tnis 
note  are to  supplemen-t  and  encourage  the financing of exports by private 
fimmr:ial  in::.;t Hutio::s  (supplier crecli t),  o..."lcl  to  ex:tc~d  ~.''3n  loa.'13  to 
foreign  governments  and  corporations for imports of Japanese  eoods  and 
services  (buyer credit).  ["Its other functions relate to  imoort 
finance  and the provision of funds  for overseas investment.J  It ma;,• 
carry out  its functions by maldng  loans,  discounting notes,  acquiring 
bonds  and  euar<mteeing liabilities - only (according to the  Lau)  \·:here 
it is "difficult" fo::·  tho banks to provide funds  on "ordinary"  term:; 
er;d  Hhere  repa.;.1aent  de. is considered certain,  but it is doubtful 
l·1hethcr the former  of these  tHo  provisos has much  meaning in ,practice. 
I.  Resour~s and Accountability 
1.  E:dm  1 s  capital is ·\·lholly  subscribed by the Government  throutsh 
appropriations from  time to time  from  the  Industi'i2..l  Investment  Gpecir.:!. 
Account.  It may :also borrm! funds  from  the GoverT..ment  or from  forei,Dl 
financial  institu"fiions:  so far all borrmting (Yen  271 1000 million as 
at end-Harch  1972)  has been  supplied by the 'lT\lst  I1'und Bureau of tne 
Government . ( Hhich consists mainly of postal  savings  and  \-;clfare 
insur~mce deposits)  - the rate for this borro1·1ing in September  1972 
stood at  6.  ~~' but has  since risen.  Further  re~ources stem  frorn 
repayments  of credits and  loans. 
2.  Ex:im  may  not,  hm·Jever,  raise funds by rece1v1nr; deposits,  borrm-:in,; 
from  the B~  of Japan  or other fincncial  institutions,  or by  issuinG 
debentures.  It::;  ma·ximwn  liability limit is equal to three  t irnes  the 
total of its capital  a~d reserve  fund. 
3.  EJcirn  is managed  by  a  President  and  a  Vice-President,  both a.ppointed 
by the  Prime Ninister for  a  term of four years  a.~d  re-appointn.ble, 
'1-ri th a  Board of not  more  th:m  six Directors  1  appointed by the  Pre3iC.ent. 
It is under the  cupervision of the Ministry of Finonce  and itz L:nnual 
budget  and  account::;  must  he  submitted to Parliament  for npproval. 
Rates  of interest charged must  cover operating expenses as "'ell as 
borrm·ling rates. 
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II. Operations 
l1t  the  end  of the  1972  financial year  (March  1973)  lonns  outst<311ding 
amounted to Y  2 ,0.35, 300  million.  Of this total  645~ was for  export 
credit  (i.e.  suppliar credit- 38%  of total for ships),  10%  for Yen 
loans  (including buyer credit),  9%  for  overseas investment  and  B~~ for 
l.mports. 
III. Supplier Credit 
1.  Exim  doea  not  itself issue credit  insurance policies.  rnia aspect 
is cl.calt  t·ti th by the  1':.inistr~· o::  Intern~i;ional 'l'r2.de  c?J"!d  Inrlust:-y. 
2.  "Medium  and  long-term"  export  credit  (normally over six months  <!11d 
up to 5 years - but  this can be  extended  in particular cases)  is 
made  available by Ex:im·to  exporters or manufacturers of  equipment 
etc.  produced  in Jap2ll  11\·!hen  fim:nce  is not  available from  priv?.te 
sources".  It does not  norm<>.ll;r  provide  all the credit - unle::;s  for 
tmy  reason  comLicrcial  b21lk  finance  is not  available and/  or the  export 
is of particular  impo~tPJJce - but  finances  7o%  of the  fin~~ceable 
portion  (contract value  less  do~-mpa;;'ment  and profits) l-:ith  the 
authorised foreign  exchange  banks providing -the  remainder at market 
rates. 
J.  There  appears to be  no  shortage  of funds  for export  credit  from the 
banks,  Hho  provhle their sha=e direct to the exporter at  a  mar}~et 
rate fixed for the  len[,i;h  of credit.  Exim  provides its share  at 
a  rate Hhich  may  vfll'y  bch:een  5.5%  and 8.5%  (it Has ·until  21  Febru0.ry 
1974  bctH8en 4.  75/a  .md  5.  75~~).  It is u.~derstood thv.t  the  lo~·mr 
rate is not  often. availe.ble  in practice and that  the "standard" rate 
is at present  around  7. 5~~ but  this can be  varied:  to  produce  the 
desired overall rate to the exporter in conjunction Hith  the  Banks' 
share.  The  resv.l ting overall range  of rates is believed at  present 
to be  approximately 7·5%- 8.5%. 
. 
4.  Ex:im  are  empm;ered to provide  pre-shipment  1 ln<.:nce,  but  this is made 
available only exceptionally a.'1d  in the vast majority of cases  ( 5'0j;) 
for ships.  Exporters  and manufacturers notv  generally have  to pay 
market rates for this type of finance. 
5·  Guarantees are available from  E:cim  for export  credit provided by the 
banks,  both that  given in conjunct ion with E:<im  and thd given i·;i thout 
any  Ex:im  participation,  but  terms  and conditions are not  knoi-m. 
.;. -
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IV.  Yen  Loans  (buyer credit) 
Yen  locns of  10 years'  term  and  over may  be  extended by Exim  to  foreib~ 
governments  or their institutions,  or to  forei,;'TI  corporations,  to pro-
vide funds  for the.import  of equipment  and  technical services from  . 
Japan  (i.e. buyer credit - which  is npparently not  available for  shorter 
periods).  Such  loans are usually (but not  ahrays)  given. in conjunction 
·\·d th the authorised foreign  exche.nge  banks  and  terms  and  conditions are 
considerably more  favourable  than those  for private credits.  Refinance 
can  also be  provided  in special circumstances to facilitate repayment 
of these  loans.  E~cim gu.ar<mtees  the b<:U1ks'  portion of the yen  loans. 
Ove:-:;.11  terr;;s  are  r.ot  s-t~cla.rd  ond  have  varied  from  10  years  i·Ii th no 
grace  period to  18  years  Hith  5 yeo.rs'  g-race.  The  interest rate nlso 
varies;  the  em-rent  average  is said to  be  in excess  of  7';~.  It is 
clear that the  system is extremely flexible. 
V.  Main differences  from  "E2C  cO\mtries 
(a)  The  feature  of the Japanese  system is flexibility as  regards  interest 
rate  ancl  other  ~.;er:ns.  The  aiu of ,Japc:mese  export credit policJ is 
to  ensure  thv.t  their exports  are  cornpctiti~~e  c?  .. nd  to thi.s  end  li:.(im'G 
interest rate  a;nd  other terms  are  in prac;:tice  determined  on  a  "case 
by case" basis.  On  the  other h{lild,  some  major Japanese  exporters 
uould like more  stability of interest rdes as this r,.;ould  help them 
in  I Bnng price::;  1  ond  there  hc.s  been pressure for  a  move  to\·:<trds  a 
s~rst8m of fixecJ.  rate  or rates. 
(b)  '1~1e  Japanese  do  not  mnl:e  the  ::::eme  rigid di3tinction be·tl-:een  export 
credit terms  and  aid tems as do  l!:CC  countries except  Fr{lilce.  This 
is apparent  frcm  the very  lonrr terms  and  loH rates available for 
buyer credit referred to above:  moreover  there is some  evidence of 
a  \'Iillinc,JTiess  to  ''mix"  aid  and  export  credit money  in certain cuses 
- for example  the  Hon~ Kong underground  scheme,  Hhere  it is under-
stood that the Japanese  might  be  prepared to make  available  ~0-year · 
aid funds  proper  (fro:n the O.E.C.F.)  in conjunc·tion Hith Exim  money. 
(c)  The  Japenese,  like the US,  have  managed to keep  the  commercial banks 
involved in firtancing  a  portion of export  credit,  and,  by  allo~ing 
them to  charge  market  rates direct to the exporters,  have  avoided 
the need for  a  refinance  system. 
(d)  Ex:im  can borrow  from  the Govon1ment  at relatively lou rates of 
interest ·rmd  thil":  helps to keep  do\m  the cost  of  export  finance.  ·  1 
HOi·rever 1  there is a  lOi·:er  lirni  t  beyond  t-thich  Ei:im  cannot  lend  as it 
must  balance its books.  This is facilitated by tho predominance 
of  ship export  crEJdit,  Hhich attracts higher rates becnuGe  of the 
OECD  Ship Understanding. • 
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I.  The  follm:inG"  are  the  main differences beh1een the US  system  e>.nd 
EEC  s;ystems :-
1.  Eximb<mk  Hr.s  oricin2.1ly  e.n  investment  bunk  and  its mai.n  activity 
remains direct  .:mel  participation finance  where  it injects some 
of its funds to  fin.:cnce  projects \vhich  it approves  and  control:-; 
after ussuring itself of their viability by  det.~iled technical 
and  economic  studies. 
2.  Exi1~bank itself is prim::tril,y  concerned •·rith  over  5 yea:r  term 
fina11ce  of  specific tr2.nsar;tio:1s.  'rh:::  equivalE:ni;  of  the 
~'opc<m supplier credit  insurance facilities is provided, 
al  thout~h on  a  much  smaller scale,  in the US  by the  Forei~-n 
Credi  t  Insurance Association  (FCIA). 
3.  Becaur;e  of its i.nvestment  b2.11kers'  approach Eximbank  is often 
support  inc;  lancer  crecli  t  ter:ns  Oc:J.sed  on  the  "pay  o:ff period"  for 
a  pc.rticular p:;:oject  th.::m  :b\u·opcan credit  insurers. 
. 
4•  Exi~b.:rrtk  can  £U~r2.ntee  lo2.ns  made  by  fin~~cial institutions 
outside  the USA  to finance  US  exports  ~nd a.ssociated  local costs 
and  ca~ express its  cu2ro~tee in the  sarne  currencies in  which 
the borroi·:er has  ag-reed  to repo.y the  lender,  although  in pr<lCtice 
this is usually U3  dollars.  ';:i thin the  EEC  credit  insurers  can 
only guarantee  ill n.:1.tional  currenc~r terms. 
II.  The  follm;ing are the mc-.in  differences  bet~·reen the Japanese  system 
and  EEC  systems:-
1.  The  feature  of the  Jap~ese system is flexibility as regards 
interest rate  and  other terms.  The  aim  of Japnnese  export  credit 
policy is to ensure that their exports are  competitive  Dnd  to this 
end  Exim's  interest rate  and  other terms  are  in practice determined 
by  a  "case by  c<1se  basis". 
2.  The  Japanese  do  not  m<J.b:•  the  same  rigid r1istinction between  export 
crc~it terms  and aid  terms  as  do  all EEC  countries  exceptin~ Prance. 
'!'his is apparent  from  the very  long terms  and  loH rates availuble 
for bu,ycr  creel it;  moreover,  there  is some  evidence  of a  \ri  11 in8"-
ness to "mix"  aiel  and.  cor~l!nercial export  credit in certain cases. 
3.  As  in the USA,  the Japanese  have  managed to keep the commercial 
banks  involved  i.n  fin;mcinc  o..  portion of export  credit  nnd,  by 
allov:ing them  to  che.rg-e  m.:li'ket  rates direct to the exporters,  have 
avoided the need for a  re-finance  system. 
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4.  Exim  cnn  borroH  from  the Government  at relatively loH rates of 
interest  1  and  this helps to keep  dmm  the  cost  of export  fin<mce o 
Hoi·Iever,  there is a  lot·:er  limit  be;yond  \\·hich  :E;;cim  c;:umot  lend as 
under current  lep,-islation it has to balance its books.  This is 
facilitated by the  predominance  of ship export  credit Hhich 
attracts higher rates because  of the  OECD  Ship Understanding  • 
.. 
• • 
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COLLAaORATION  BETWEEN  CREDIT  INSURERS  TO  DEAL  WITH 
CONTRACTS  INVOLVING  SUPPLIES  FROM  MORE  THAN  ONE  COUNTRY 
This  annex  summarises  existing practices in this area. 
Reciprocal  cover 
A  Community  Agreement  exists amongst  the credit insurers 
of  Member  States  to provide  cover for certain exports  emanating 
from  another Member  State  on  a  reciprocal basis.  As  a  result, 
goods  to  be  supplied under  subcontracts  placed  in one  EEC 
country  are  treated for  the  purposes  of  cover in the  same  way 
as  the  goods  to be  supplied  by  the main  contractor who  will 
be  situated in another  EEC  country. 
The  credit insurers have  agreed  to  limit  the  EEC  subcontract 
element  to 40%  of  total contract value  for contracts under  7.5 
million units  of  account,  and  thereafter to  provide  for  a  sliding 
scale  to  30%  of  total contract value  for contracts over  10  million 
units of  account. 
The  goods  which  are  to benefit  from  the  reciprocal  cover 
must  form an  integral part of  the main contract.  Other  goods  which 
may  be  used  in conjunction with  the  project being financed  may 
not  be  aggregated  for  the  purpose  of obtaining the benefit of  this 
·Agreement. 
The  terms  of  this Agreement  cover credit insurance  as well as 
finance  provided  from official sources.  As  a  result,  the  main - 2  - ANNEX  IV 
contractor may  undertake  to  obtain goods under  a  subcontract 
to which  these reciprocal arrangements  apply  on  cash  or near 
cash  terms. 
This  is  the  simplest  way  of  obtaining insurance  for  a 
foreign  subcontract.  It is subject, of  course,  to  the  over-riding 
principle  that  a  credit insurer may  refuse  to grant  cover  in 
respect  of  a  contract which,  in his  view,  presents unusual 
features  or risks which  are unduly  large.  In practice, in 
evaluating  the  risk,  the  insurer will  take  the  total contract 
value,  including its foreign  element,  into account.  Where 
the  amount  available  for  covering a  certain market  or a  certain 
buyer  is  limited,  a  national credit  insurance  scheme will in  the 
last resort always  give  preference  to its own  exporters. 
There  are differing views  on  what  is understood  by 
reciprocity in this  connection.  It has  been argued,  within  the 
EEC,  that this  involves not  only  insurance cover,  but also  the 
financing credit  so  as  to  strike a  balance,  in quantitative 
terms,  between  the  participants.  Where  large contracts are 
concerned  therefore,  the  existing arrangements  are not  capable 
of meeting all exigencies.  For  instance,  one  important  problem, 
that of  the  exchange  risk and  how  to  share it, is left to  the 
determination of  the  contracting parties. 
2.  Co-insurance 
Where it is impossible  to obtain cover  on  the  reciprocal 
•  •  o I . . . • 
\'o  ···i 
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basis described above, it may  be  possible  to arrange  for 
co-insurance.  Thus,  if a  buyer either enters into  separate 
contracts with his various  suppliers, or into one  contract with 
all suppliers  (setting out clearly under  the  terms  of  the 
latter the  rights  and  obligations  of  each  supplier),  then  those 
suppliers may  be  able  to obtain insurance  from  their own  national 
credit insurers.  These  in turn will agree  among  themselves  to 
act  together with regard  to all insurance matters  concerning 
that project,  and  in particular,  they will undertake  to consult 
each  other in the  event of  loss or threatened  loss. 
It would  appear  that buyers  noW  show  a  certain preference 
for  one  contract comprising all elements  of  supply  ("turnkey" 
contracts).  Under  these  contracts responsibility for  performance 
generally falls  on  the  main  contractor and  finance  is made 
available  from  one  source. 
3.  Joint  insurance 
Where  a  buyer insists on  a  single contract and  the  main 
supplier is unwilling or unable  to bear  the  whole  payment  risk 
himself,  he  may  try  to  pass  on  some  of  the risk to  sub-contractors 
r.:... 
by  making  their right  to  payment  from him conditional upon his 
having received  payment  from  the  buyer  ("if and  when"  contracts). 
Normally  such  sub-contracts are not eligible for  cover  by 
credit insurers  because  the  sub-contractor has  no  legal rights 
against  the  buyer.  However,  in an attempt  to  remedy  this 
situation,  the  EEC  countries have  come  to an  agreement  whereby 
"joint insurance" is granted,  the  main contractor and  any 
... / ...  TS ·~  . 
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sub-contractors  being covered  separately  by  their respective 
national credit insurers.  Again,  the credit insurers concerned 
agree  to advise  each other concerning  the  progress of  the 
project.  A  particular feature  of  joint insurance is that  the 
main insurer agrees  to  take action by  requiring the main 
contractor to minimise  loss  and  effect recoveries  for  the  whole 
of  the  contract.·  In  this way  the main  insurer looks after  the 
interests of  the  sub-contractors as well. 
This  technique has  been used  so  far only for  supplier 
credit but, as  far as  is known,  it has not yet been  put  to  the 
test in a  loss  situation.  Whether it would  then  be  possible 
for  the  main  insurer  to  provide  adequate  protection for  the 
interests of  sub-contractors  remains  to  be  seen.  In  any  event, 
this method  in no  way  assists  the  financing  of  sub-contracts 
nor does it solve  the  problem of  the  exchange risk. 
4.  Re-insurance 
Here  the main  insurer agrees  to cover  the  whole  contract 
and  in turn receives re-insurance cover from  the national credit 
insurers responsible  for  the  amounts  of  the  sub-contracts  involved. 
On  this  basis,  the  main  contractor can undertake  to  pay  sub-
contractors on  a  certain date.  Under  this method  reinsurers 
(i.e.  the  insurers of  the  sub-contractors)  have  to accept  the 
decisions of  the main  insurer and  the main contractor on-matters 
such as  how  to  prevent or minimise  loss,  the  admission of claims 
and  so  on. 
.  .. / ... 
• 
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There has  as yet been little practical experience  of  the 
operation of re-insurance in the field of export credits.  Some 
important credit insurers are not authorised  by  their domestic 
legislation to enter into re-insurance  arrangements.  The  system 
is only  likely to be  practicable where  either the  terms  of cover 
of  the  two  insurers are  similar or where  the re-insurer is 
prepared  to adjust his normal  terms  of  cover ,to  those of  the 
principal insurer.  As  with  joint insurance,  re-insurance does 
not in itself ensure  that finance  for  sub-contractors will be 
forthcoming  or deal with  problems  which  may  arise  from  the 
exchange  risk. 
5.  MUltinational  buyer credit financial  packages 
In  a  few  cases  arrangements  have  been made  to offer a  buyer 
a  coordinated financial  package  based  on  loan contributions  from 
two  or more  supplying countries.  Experience  in this field is again 
very  limited  and  the arrangements  so far made  have not  gone 
beyond  the  introduction of  parallel credit lines,  each  lender 
obtaining separate bills of  exchange  and  guarantees  from  the 
borrower.  Such  loans  have  been  made  in different currencies 
and  at different interest rates. • 
ANNEX  V 
EXCHANGE  RISKS  AND  THE  ROLE  OF  THE  UNIT  OF  ACCOUNT 
1.  General 
An  exchange risk,  in the broad sense of the term,  occurs  where 
an exporter or importer acquires  an  "exchange position",  that is, 
becomes  the creditor or debtor  of his foreign  counterpart  in a  currency 
other than his own. 
Recently,  particularly in connection with  the  joint float, 
currency rates have  fluctuated markedly,  thus  increasing exchange 
risks proportionately. 
An  exporter or importer has very frequently to agree to his 
trade contract's being in a  currency other than his own.  In that  event 
the  exchange risk can  sometimes be neutralized or reduced by the 
inclusion  in the  contract  of an  "exchange  clause" providing for the 
limitation or sharing of any losses. 
Obviously,  this device,  owing to the variation in prices which 
it entails,  is very liable to have  adverse effects on  the  importers' 
or exporters'  competitive position.  Accordingly,  in practice another 
method is .used - coverage  of the  exchange risk by forward buying or 
selling of currency. 
But  in the present  monetary situation this method  too has 
considerable  drawbacks: 
(a)  at best it is hardly possible at present  to cover an  exchanee  risk 
beyond  one  year ahead.  For  instance,  as things now  stand the  French 
franc  and  the lira cannot  be  covered for more  than six months. 
In the case of long-term contracts,  moreover  (five years or longer), 
it is necessary to effect  "rollover"  forward  exchange  operations, 
which  oome  very expensive; 
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(b)  furthermore,  some  countries  impose  limits on this class of operations.  _____  ...,~--- -· 
~he unit-of-account  method would  dispose of some  of these problems: 
in particular the  great  advantage of the  ''basket"-type of account  is 
that its variations are  smaller than the variations in its component 
currencies. 
2.  Monetary medium  of EEB  contracts 
(a)  Preliminary remarks 
The  use  of a  single monetary instrument,  whether  an  actual  currency 
or a  created unit  of account,  is essential to the  financial  management  of 
an  agency with pluri-national relations. 
In addition,  as the EEB  would not  be  supposed in principle to  assume 
exchange  risks,  the  nature  of the  loans  granted by it would  depend  on  the 
nature of the  funds  assembled.  It is planned that it should be able to 
raise loans  in the various  money  markets,  both in national  currencies  and 
in EUC;  in this regard the  role of the market  would be  decisive. 
(b)  Units  of account 
Contracts,  and  indeed trade transactions,  could quite well be  in 
units  of account:  the choice lies in practice between the two  official 
''basket"  units of account,  SDR  and  EUC. 
The  SDR  is a  basket based on  the sixteen most  important  world 
currencies,  of which  the Community  currencies account  for only  just  over 
half.  Its use would have the  great  disadvantage  of obliging Community 
nationals to assume  commitments,  and hence  exchange risks,  in  a  unit  of 
account  moving  5o%  independently of their currencies. 
The  EUC  is a  basket based solely on  the nine Community  currencies, 
the initial percentages being determined for  each  country on  the basis of 
its GNP  and  intra-European trade.  Calculated according to the  exchange 
rates,  and with its conversion rates published daily in the Official 
Journal  of the European Communities,  it would thus be  representatives of 
the average movement  of the  exchange rates of the Community  currencies  • 
.  ;. 
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It could be  employed in the balance-sheet  of the EEB  and  as  the 
medium  for  contracts. 
It could also be  used  for EEB  loans,  even if the  contracts were 
actually expressed in the  currency of one  of the  joint suppliers: 
the  supplier whose  currency was  used would  derive no particular benefit 
since all the  suppliers  could use  the  currency of the contract  for 
repaying the EEC  loans. 
The  exchange risks  in connection with  loans based  on  the 
EUC/contract  currency conversion rates would be  smaller than between 
two  currencies,  since the  EUC  would necessarily move  within the 
span between  the  Community  currencies. 